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In response to Töpfer’s incisive critique of how current work on global production networks 
and global financial networks have been too firm-centric and reliant on neoliberal market 
framings, this commentary highlights three key points for developing deeper 
conceptualisation of the state in financial processes and networks. The first addresses the role 
of the state and inter-firm relations, the second deals with conceptualisations of power and 
agency, and the third is a call to go boldly beyond authoritarian capitalist regimes in moving 
towards a state-led conceptualisation of global financial networks.  
 




Laura-Marie Töpfer’s paper (2018) takes on the current literature on global production 
networks (GPN) and the more recent conceptualisation of global financial networks (GFN) to 
argue for a more systematic and incisive analysis of the state and its role in global production. 
I am sympathetic to this argument and also agrees that the current conceptual framing of key 
actors and structural dimensions of GPNs have been too firm-centric, with a structural 
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emphasis on neoliberal forces, and does not adequately capture the complexities of state-firm 
relations in the explanations of global production and regional developmental outcomes. 
These concerns echo recent calls for more substantive and dynamic treatment of state actors 
in global economic networks (see, for example, McKinnon 2012; Smith 2015; Yeung and 
Coe 2015). Such attempts have been even more limited within the GFN literature due to the 
newness of the framework and also its territorial (rather than actor-centric) focus in the initial 
conceptualisation (Coe et al. 2014). While the paper makes an important theoretical 
contribution in offering a refined understanding of agency within GFNs (which is 
convincingly borne out through the empirical study of Chinese cross-border finance), I also 
feel that it did not go quite far enough in certain dimensions.  
 In this context, I want to highlight three key points in this commentary with regards to 
how we could develop deeper conceptualisations of the state in economic processes 
(particularly in terms of financial processes and networks), and implications for agency and 
power in GFNs. The first addresses the role of the state and inter-firm relations, the second 
deals with conceptualisations of power and agency, and the third is a call to go beyond 
authoritarian capitalist regimes in moving towards a state-led conceptualisation of GFNs. A 
point of clarification here: while Töpfer points out that the GFN framework highlights 
advanced business services (including finance), international financial centres (IFCs) and 
offshore jurisdictions as vital building blocks that connects financial actors with global 
production “by facilitating the transfer of funds between buyers and suppliers” (Töpfer 2018: 
XX), the original arguments in Coe et al. (2014) also specify the importance of 
financialisation logics and pressures in shaping the business strategies of firms in GPNs. As 
such my comments address more than just capital circulation but also the mobilisation of 




In the GFN framework (Coe et al. 2014), the state was left unspecified as the focus was then 
on territorial dimensions and how jurisdictions were vital in shaping the flows and purposes 
of international finance and production strategies. This lacuna is specifically addressed in 
Töpfer’s paper in terms of how the Chinese state plays a pivotal role in shaping specific firm 
strategies and industry changes in cross border flows of finance. However, the core 
arguments seem to attribute overwhelming power to the state instead of a more nuanced 
consideration of how state-firm relations and power might actually be contested and 
renegotiated. This state-led conceptualisation of GFN could go further in examining the 
dynamic relationship between states and firms. Even if the state is reconceptualised from 
being ‘market mediator’ to ‘market maker’, an argument which I am sympathetic to, the 
treatment of state-firm relationships could be more nuanced, especially bearing in mind how 
lead firms are precisely able to achieve and maintain that premier position in their networks 
through bargaining, consolidation and other forms of leverage vis-à-vis other firms and 
organisations, and this also includes state entities.  
More specifically, the actual state-firm intersections and co-constituted nature GFN 
formation could be more deeply examined. Joe Daniels and I (Lai and Daniels 2017) made 
similar arguments directed at financialisation studies when examining the transformation of 
Singaporean banking firms into financial services corporations. While financialisation studies 
do feature the state and state actors, the analyses tend to emphasise market imperatives and 
neoliberal logics over state power and functions, or positions financialisation as a deliberate 
pathway sought by state actors and policymakers due to state incapacities to resolve internal 
crises (e.g. budget deficits, economic recessions). These approaches underplay the strategic 
ways in which the state actively mobilises institutions and firms to adopt and enact 
financialisation scripts for political-economic purposes. This kind of state-led financialisation 
 4 
emerges from normative influence of the state in the everyday business practices of firms and 
implies a co-constituted production of acceptable business practice by firms and states.  
To illustrate what I mean in terms of delving deeper into state-firm relations in GFNs, 
let me offer an example based on how states could shape the financialisation of banks 
through certain mechanisms. Firstly, states could shape firm behaviour and business 
decisions via direct ownership (either full or partial) of banks. Although many banks have 
undergone privatization as part of the broader trend of denationalization of state assets and 
institutions since the 1970s, many governments in Asia and other parts of the world still have 
significant ownership stakes in banks, even if they are not completely state-owned entities 
(China would be an obvious example here). The contemporary relevance of state ownership 
of banks is also demonstrated after the 2008 financial crisis with the flurry of bank bailouts in 
the USA, UK, Netherlands and elsewhere. Langley (2015), for example, offers a nuanced and 
extensive analysis of how states and financial institutions intersect in the course of financial 
crisis management interventions in the US and UK (2008-2011). Secondly, regulatory 
mechanisms could be used to shape the responses and behaviour of banks towards different 
types of financial markets and products by making it more or less profitable (or tedious) to 
pursue particular business segments. Changes in the licensing of banking activities, for 
instance, could be used to either ‘ring-fence’ certain financial activities for foreign banks 
according to tiers of licensing (thus shielding domestic banks) or encourage foreign 
competition so as to push domestic banks into exploring new markets (Lai 2011). Thirdly, 
states could intersect with banks more indirectly through a form of ‘leaning in’, whereby state 
interests or official rhetoric could filter through to management decisions via influential 
positions on the boards of directors of banks. A structure of governing elites consisting of 
former politicians, civil servants and regulators circulating between state institutions and 
governing bodies of banks is common in many Asian economies and encourages compliance 
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with financial policies and regulations (Hamilton-Hart 2002).Finally, industry lead firms that 
are under some form of state-ownership or patronage could be used to influence the 
behaviour of other smaller banks through ‘demonstration effect’, especially since the 
behaviour and strategy of such lead firms often signal future growth sectors. All these 
encapsulates the co-constituted nature of state-firm relations in shaping financialisation and 
other business strategies and outcomes such that the very nature of what constitutes state 
influence or firm influence needs rethinking.  
 
Power and agency  
While issues of power and agency pertaining to the state and state actors in GFNs are 
explored in Töpfer’s paper, it marks only a starting point in terms of further engagement with 
how power and agency are mobilised, reconfigured or contested in GFNs. The paper 
references John Allen’s (2016) work in defining power as “an agent’s control over material 
and non-material resources in bargaining processes that span different agents and locations”, 
but the empirical case and explanations could go further in explicating the multiscalar 
dimensions and differentiated actors involved in such dynamic bargaining processes. For 
instance, what are different types and levels of state-firm bargaining? What forms of agency 
is being mobilised by state actors in shaping firm behaviour and strategies? What about 
negotiations and bargaining between different state actors within the same national economy 
or between different nation-states in global economic networks?  
In this vein, we should reconsider the value of geopolitical factors and diplomatic 
relationships in shaping our understanding of state actors, in terms of their agency and how 
power might be mobilised or exercised, and impacts on policy decisions or state investments 
that shape global financial flows. In the paper, Töpfer highlights guanxi networks and 
cultural ties to explain the receptiveness of the Chinese state to investments from certain 
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countries and the allocation of bigger trading volumes and quotas. However, political 
favouritism for certain economies is not just due to cultural explanations but also tied to 
broader geopolitical environment and relationships with state actors in other countries. The 
paper acknowledges this through the example of Taiwan seeking RQFII quotas. In the same 
spirit, we should engage more seriously with broader geopolitical concerns that shape cross 
border capital flows and examine the differentiated agency of state and firm actors within 
such political economic contexts. Just keeping to the China example, one could think of the 
One-China policy, South China Sea disputes, Chinese investments and hydropower projects 
along the Mekong river, and the Belt and Road Initiative in terms of how developmental 
goals, corporate strategies and international relations intersect in dynamic and slippery ways 
that have significant impacts on state-state and state-firm relationships in production 
networks.  
One way to analyse such a coalition of multiple actors with shifting configurations 
and relationship could be through an ecology lens (Lai 2016; Langley and Leyshon 2017), 
which recasts a broader financial network as a collection of smaller constitutive ecologies. In 
terms of power and agency, we could, for instance, view GFNs as simultaneous and 
overlapping power formations operating within shifting configurations of financial ecologies, 
with uneven connectivity and material outcomes. Specific forms of state-firm relations could 
therefore emerge from the entanglement of diverse motivations and plurality of power in 
conjectural formations. 
 
More than just “Chinese characteristics”?  
My final point has to do with theorising from Asia (or elsewhere outside of Anglo-American 
scholarship). Töpfer’s paper claims to develop an empirically grounded theoretical approach 
of GFN “with Chinese characteristics” — I wonder if that is too specific and limiting. A more 
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ambitious and impactful argument could be made using this empirically grounded analysis to 
reconceptualise state-firm relationships in the operation of GFNs not just in authoritarian 
capitalist economies like China but other economies more widely. Reconceptualising state 
power and agency in global economic networks should be relevant (and in fact, vital) for 
understanding GPNs and GFNs more extensively as state roles and impacts have largely been 
underspecified or taken for granted as being shaped by broadly neoliberal principles – when 
that might not true. One could think of the policy response and actions of various 
governments in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crises in bailing out banks, 
nationalisation and substantive re-regulation of banking and financial activities. These have 
reshaped financial markets and actions in ways that were previously unthinkable within a 
neoliberal market-driven ideology. The fact that these have taken place in the USA, UK and 
Europe does not preclude them from being analysed on the same conceptual terms as 
authoritarian capitalist economies, Asian developmental states or coordinated market 
economies. More than just pushing at conceptual boundaries in economic geography, such an 
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